This article considers the constitutional requirements and implications of Article 50 TEU for the European Union. Despite its rapid rise to fame in the aftermath of the 23 June 2016 referendum on British membership of the European Union, this sparsely worded provision raises more questions that it answers. While currently under intense scrutiny from the perspective of UK constitutional law, the key terms and aspects of Article 50 itself have received less attention. Yet once the withdrawal process commences, it will also, and crucially so, be governed by the law of the European Union.
The article then examines the implications of its constitutionalist reading for future relations between the UK and the EU. As the withdrawal agreement laid down in Article 50(2) TEU is subject to a qualified majority vote in the Council and the consent of the European Parliament, there is no individual role for the member states, and the withdrawal agreement does not need their approval. While the prevailing view is that the agreement will deal only with the terms of withdrawal, and not future UK-EU relations, this ignores the fact that agreements concluded by the EU may have as their legal basis more than one provision in the EU Treaties. There are no significant barriers to a withdrawal agreement that also regulates the future legal basis of UK-EU relations on a different basis from Article 50 TEU.
In light of this discussion, the article considers what impact the constitutional requirements of the Union have on the Miller litigation (Section IV). All parties to the Miller case accept the referendum result as advisory. The referendum outcome itself does not constitute the United Kingdom's "decision" to withdraw from the EU. With Cameron and May stating unequivocally that the result will be accepted, however, the focus has been on the power of notification, and whether government or the parliament wields it. This emphasis does not concord with the stipulations of Article 50 itself, which privileges the Member State's decision, taken "in accordance with its own constitutional requirements" -language not usually featured in international law -and makes reference to notification as a mere procedural provision.
The Miller judgment (Divisional Court) held that prerogative power lies outside the purview of the Courts only because the Crown cannot alter domestic law by making or unmaking a treaty. The judges held that the European Communities Act (ECA) is a constitutional statute and that the Crown does not possess the power to vary domestic law through the exercise of prerogative powers.
As per Article 50, withdrawal is also very different from accession to the EU or Treaty amendment. The decision itself is unilateral: there is no need for the EU or any other member state to agree to it. The EU Treaties will cease to apply after the two-year deadline, regardless of whether an agreement is reached. Even if the British parliament disagrees with the terms of any agreement, it will need to approve it, or there will be no agreement at all. It is therefore incorrect to suggest, the authors argue, that Parliament will be able to have its say at the end of the process. Because of the deadline, Article 50 provides that it is the decision to withdraw which needs to be taken in accordance with the Member State's own constitutional requirements. On the conditions of approval of a final deal, the provision is silent.
I. Introduction
Never before has a provision of EU law become so well known in such a short space of time as Article 50 TEU. In a seismic vote on 23 June 2016, the British people decided with a clear but by no means overwhelming majority that the United Kingdom should leave the EU. The "should" is important: in legal terms, the referendum was purely advisory. The outcome was unexpected, even by the Leave camp, and it is clear that the UK government (hereafter the Government) was wholly unprepared for the challenges that Brexit entails. 1 Article 50 TEU is a sparsely worded provision, which raises more questions than it answers and which is of course wholly untested.
2 While litigation concerning the triggering of Article 50 from the perspective of UK constitutional law is on-going in the UK, 3 that litigation leaves to 1 See, for example: 'Labour Says UK Facing Brexit 'Unprepared and Ill-equipped'', Sky News 23/11/2016 <http://news.sky.com/story/labour-says-uk-facing-brexit-unprepared-and-ill-equipped-10668913> accessed 10/12/2016; 'Leaked Memo Says UK Government has no Plan for Brexit', Aljazeera 15/09/2016, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/11/leaked-memo-uk-government-planbrexit-161115081621073.html> accessed 10/12/2016 ; 'EU's Schulz: UK Government was Unprepared for Brexit Vote', Associated Press 23/09/2016,< http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-eusschulz-uk-government-was-unprepared-for-brexit-vote-2016-9?IR=T> accessed 10/12/2016. 2 While some prior withdrawals from the Union have taken place (Algeria, Greenland) these are of a very different kind. They concerned the granting of independence and home rule, respectively, to territories that belonged to Member States that remained in the Union, rather than the withdrawal of a Member State itself. Furthermore, both of these partial withdrawals took place well before Article 50 was introduced and, indeed, even before a clearer aspiration for further political integration was set out in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Even though some lessons regarding institutional cooperation may be drawn from these instances, therefore, these are largely limited: A F Tatham, 'Don't Mention Divorce at the Wedding, Darling!': EU Accession and Withdrawal after Lisbon' in P Eeckhout, A Biondi, and S Ripley (eds), EU Law After Lisbon (OUP 2012) 5 one side the meaning of key terms and aspects of Article 50 itself. Once the withdrawal process formally commences, though, it is clear that in addition to any concerns it may raise from the viewpoint of national law, it will be governed by the law of the European Union in a number of ways.
This paper aims to contribute to the debate on the interpretation of Article 50. Our overarching argument is that withdrawal requires compliance with EU constitutional law if the EU is to preserve its sui generis character as a supranational order that creates rights and obligations for its subjects (institutions, Member States and private persons). 4 In turn, the proposed constitutionalist reading has significant implications for the nature of the negotiations and the future relationship between the UK and the Union.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we explain why a constitutionalist reading of Article 50 is essential (Section II). We then discuss in more detail what such a reading entails and how it influences the negotiations and future relationship between the UK and the EU 
II. The Need for a Constitutionalist Reading
It is often said that Article 50 was never intended to be used 5 and that it was hastily drafted; yet its drafting process shows that it was seriously considered and debated. Whereas it was the Lisbon Treaty that ultimately brought this provision into EU law, Article 50 (or, rather, Article 59, as it then was) was negotiated within the Convention on the Future of Europe and formed part of the Constitutional Treaty. The text of the provision was changed substantially from the first 6 to the final draft of the Constitution. 7 Notably, while the first draft did not contain any limitations on the withdrawing state's re-accession to the Union, two important provisos In turn, the interpretation of Article 50 affects the Union's very identity as a constitutional order with specific commitments to fundamental rights, common values, and the rule of law.
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To adopt any interpretation thereof other than a constitutionalist one would amount to an implicit refutation of that identity -an identity that distinguishes the Union from other supranational organisations.
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The EU is expressly founded on constitutional values, enumerated as "respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities." 22 It is obvious that a national decision, such as the UK's referendum vote and the process of withdrawal that it triggers, may raise concerns about the degree of respect for many of these values. The potential effect of withdrawal on those values is such that the provisions governing this process must be subject to a constitutionalist interpretation: it concerns key questions of public interest for both the EU and as discussed above. It had also been suggested that the phrase 'in accordance with its own constitutional requirements' should be removed altogether as it was not in the EU's interest, as it entrusted it with the oversight of national constitutional requirements. 60 Its retention is therefore significant. It suggests that respect for the constitutional requirements of a withdrawing state, whatever these may be, must underpin the withdrawal process, even if it is less expedient and more costly for the Union. That position is further supported by the inclusion of a clause of respect for national constitutional identities in Article 4(2) TEU, which in turn renders that respect part of its own constitution.
Other important concerns had been the maintenance of individual rights, the protection of Union values and respect for international law. 61 One of the most interesting suggestions made was the introduction of an Article 50bis, which would create an alternative form of membership of the Union, for those members that wished to remain closely linked to the EU but did not share the political ambition of further unification, such as the UK. The proposal, which was made by Andrew Duff, Lamberto Dini, Paul Helminger, Rein Lang, and Lord
Maclennan, would essentially have allowed for associate (rather than full) membership of the Union, entailing economic cooperation without ever closer union in other fields. 62 However, none of these amendments were adopted.
From a constitutional perspective, the intentions of the drafters are significant and are likely to play a role in the interpretation of this provision, should it come before the Court of Justice.
In the past, the Court made use of a teleological methodology that did not make reference to the drafters' actual intentions. As Lenaerts has explained, this was largely the case because the travaux of the Treaties were not available. welcome. 64 A reading informed by the travaux contributes to ensuring that the subjects of law meaningfully identify as its authors through the representative process. 65 Indeed, in light of the fact that many provisions of the Constitutional Treaty were copied into the Lisbon Treaty, the Court of Justice has become more receptive to interpretations arising from preparatory documents and these are likely to play an important role in the future. 66 Thus, particularly since the Article 50 process is unprecedented, an adequate constitutional analysis must take account of the information regarding the content and goals of this provision that emerges from its drafting context.
The latter reveals that the insertion of a unilateral right to voluntary withdrawal was far from uncontroversial. It is interesting that, while a series of very cumbersome clauses were not inserted into the provision, they had been voiced in the negotiations and enjoyed some support. As such, it is only to some extent true that Article 50 privileges the EU and its remaining members, as opposed to the withdrawing state. In fact, the version of the withdrawal clause that was retained was one of the most lenient (no limitation clause) but also the most vague. The vagueness that characterises Article 50 today was clearly linked to the delegates' inability to reach agreement concerning the strictness of the withdrawal process and, hence, on a more precise wording for the provision itself, which can be attributed to very different perspectives on the goals and nature of the Constitutional Treaty.
Still, as we have highlighted, the travaux of the Convention clarify two important issues: firstly, that respect for the constitutional requirements of the withdrawing state is a key component of an EU-constitutional-law-compliant reading of Article 50. Secondly, the broad discretion allowed in respect of Article 50(1) was intended to be counterbalanced by stricter conditions under Article 50(3) in order to prevent the withdrawing state holding the Union hostage in the negotiations.
B. Article 50 and the Need to Respect Existing Rights: Substantive Constitutional Requirements for the Negotiations and Future Agreement
In addition to the information that can be gleaned from the travaux, a constitutional interpretation of Article 50 requires engagement with the settled features of the EU constitutional order, the most relevant of which relate to respect for individual rights, as 64 Ibid. 65 implementing EU directives and framework decisions; 69 a) these rights will be removed from their parent legislation and the jurisdiction of the CJEU, resulting in reduced possibilities of judicial review; b) they will lose the primacy of EU law over inconsistent UK legislation; and c)
there is no safeguard against future repeal. Arguably, this has implications not only for the UK but also for the Union, whose commitment to these rights and freedoms remains in place.
As noted earlier, during the Constitutional Convention, a number of delegates had proposed amendments that safeguarded existing rights, which were not adopted. 70 or agreement that does not guarantee, at a minimum, existing Convention rights will be inherently problematic. In addition, the relevant interpretation of human rights will often be not just that of the Convention, but that of the Treaties and Charter. 75 EU institutions must look to the latter during, as well as after the negotiations -it forms the basis on which they will be held to account. 76 In respect of many of the rights involved, the EU level of protection is particularly high.
In her evidence on the human rights implications of Brexit, Kirsty Hughes rightly notes that
Article 8 ECHR will be engaged, should the UK wish to expel EU citizens. 77 The Convention proportionality, and principles of democratic governance, such as consistent consultation with civil society. In other words, while the case law on this point is not unlimited, the loss of any form of citizenship -certainly one that has been enjoyed consistently, in its current form, for almost twenty-five years -merits a measured response by the parties to the negotiations and, ultimately, oversight by domestic courts and the Court of Justice alike, so as to meet existing safeguards of the EU constitutional order.
It must be added that the current political discourse on the withdrawal process, particularly in the United Kingdom, stands in stark contrast with a constitutionalist approach to Article 50.
The process is spoken of in purely intergovernmental terms, with the overriding aim of reaching the "best deal for Britain", particularly in terms of economic outcomes. 99 Such a discourse completely disregards the fact that Brexit involves this seismic shock to individual rights -a shock whose severity depends on the outcome of the Article 50 process. That process, in turn, is by definition concerned not with the best deal for Britain, but with respect for the EU constitutional order -an order that, up until withdrawal, still includes the UK. to respect it at any point during the withdrawal process raises immediate concerns not only for EU constitutional law but also for UK constitutional law itself.
C. Implications of a Constitutionalist Reading for the Legal Basis of the Agreement Detailing Future Relations
Article 50(2) TEU lays down the procedure to be followed for the negotiation of an agreement, between the EU and the withdrawing state, "setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union". A bare reading of the provision reveals some noteworthy points. The withdrawal agreement is subject to a qualified-majority vote in the Council, and needs the consent of the European Parliament.
However, there is no individual role for the Member States, and the withdrawal agreement does not need their approval (it is not a "mixed" agreement). Further, the "arrangements for ... withdrawal" are wholly undefined, except for the proviso that account should be taken of the framework for the future relationship. This is unspecific language, which is open to a range of different interpretations.
At the time of writing, the prevailing view appears to be that the withdrawal agreement can or will only deal with the actual terms of withdrawal, and that the future relationship will need to be negotiated post-Brexit, when the United Kingdom will have become a third country.
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There is also speculation about a transitional period, which may or may not be part of the However, a constitutionalist reading of Article 50 requires that these various assumptions be subjected to a deeper analysis. There is a whole body of law on EU competence, internal and external; on the reasons for mixed agreements; and on the appropriate legal basis for the conclusion of an international agreement. 110 As no decisions have been taken yet on how withdrawal and future relations will be structured, it is too early to offer any in-depth suggestions. Nevertheless, the existing body of law allows for some initial comments on the proposed course of action.
A first question is the extent to which the withdrawal agreement could regulate the future relationship between the United Kingdom and the EU. The wording of Article 50(2) instructs the negotiators to take account of the framework for the future relationship. These are enigmatic terms, in that they do not spell out what is meant by this "framework", nor whether that framework needs to be part of a separate agreement. Textually, all that can be said is that the withdrawal agreement should include references to the future relationship. However, it is less obvious to read Article 50 as conferring competence on the EU to regulate, in the withdrawal agreement, both the terms of withdrawal and the full organisation of the future relationship. That would appear to involve substantially more than "setting out the arrangements for ... withdrawal."
It must however be noted that agreements concluded by the EU may have more than one provision in the EU Treaties as their legal basis. In terms of EU legal principle, we do not see any significant barriers to a withdrawal agreement which also regulates the future relationship, on a legal basis different from Article 50 TEU. If that future relationship were confined to trade matters, Article 207 TFEU would constitute the relevant provision. If, however, the future relationship includes a range of EU policy areas in which the United Kingdom may wish to continue to cooperate with the EU, as could perhaps be expected despite all the talk about a hard Brexit, an association pursuant to Article 217 TFEU ought to be considered.
The latter provision is as vague as Article 50, in that an association is barely defined: it involves "reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedure". The Court of Justice has determined that an association agreement empowers the EU to guarantee commitments towards non-member countries in all the fields covered by the Treaties. 111 The competence to conclude association agreements is, in substantive terms, the broadest external competence for which the EU Treaties provide. There would therefore seem to be no compelling legal reasons for requiring the United Kingdom to withdraw from the EU first, before negotiating a new agreement on its future relationship.
A further point to note is that, even if most association agreements are mixed agreements, it is doubtful whether the determination of the future relationship requires mixity. The reference to notification in Article 50(2), by contrast, can be read as a mere procedural provision, the opening phrase to the process of negotiating a withdrawal agreement. The
Member State shall notify the European Council, which will subsequently draw up negotiating guidelines. There is nevertheless a clear and stark effect of notification: it starts the two-year clock ticking, after which effective withdrawal ensues (Article 50(3)).
The distinction between the withdrawal decision and its notification is significant for a number of interpretative issues posed by Article 50, as is shown below. For example, the question whether the notification is revocable looks different from the question whether the withdrawing Member State is able to revoke its decision to withdraw.
In what follows we do not propose to enter fully into the UK constitutional law debate that the Barber/Hickman/King blog and the Miller litigation have set off. Instead, we stand back a little from that debate, and look at it through an EU law lens. We consider that to be a useful exercise because the nature and effect of EU law deserve more consideration, for reasons we will explore. We start with a short summary of the Divisional Court's judgment in Miller, followed by three broad observations: on the effects of the withdrawal decision and its notification; on the rights conferred by EU law; and on broader normative questions associated with the respective roles of parliaments and governments in international treatymaking. We then move on to a discussion of the revocability of the notification of a duly notified decision to withdraw and consider the significance of this question from the EU perspective, independently of the Miller judgment.
A. The Miller Judgment (Divisional Court)
In Miller, the Divisional Court premised its analysis on the sovereignty of the UK Parliament, and regarded the Royal Prerogative as the "residue" of legal authority left in the hands of the Crown. 122 It nevertheless recognised that the prerogative power is wide in international affairs, and outside the purview of the Courts, but found that that was precisely so because the Crown cannot alter domestic law by making or unmaking a treaty. The Crown "cannot without the intervention of Parliament confer rights on individuals or deprive individuals of rights". 123 The Divisional Court then turned to the direct link which existed between rights under EU law, and UK domestic law, through the combination of the direct effect and primacy of EU law, on the one hand, and the European Communities Act (1972) on the other. The ECA was required to give domestic effect to EU law rights; is considered a constitutional statute; and has been amended whenever the EU Treaties have been amended. 124 The
Divisional Court distinguished three categories of EU law rights which are given domestic effect: (i) rights capable of replication in the law of the United Kingdom; (ii) rights enjoyed in other EU Member States; and (iii) rights that, upon withdrawal, could not be replicated in UK law. 125 The Court found that withdrawal would affect each of those categories of rights. It is worth highlighting that, even as regards the first category, the Court found that it was no answer to the claimants' case to say that Parliament could always re-enact those rights, after withdrawal: "The objection remains that the Crown, through exercise of its prerogative powers, would have deprived domestic law rights created by the ECA 1972 of effect".
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The Divisional Court then firmly rejected the Secretary of State's case, which was to say that the prerogative power to withdraw from the EU had been left intact by Parliament. The Court considered that this interpretation disregarded the relevant constitutional background, which is that the ECA is a constitutional statute, and that the Crown does not have the power to vary the law of the land by the exercise of its prerogative powers. 127 The Crown's prerogative power operated only on the international plane. 128 A careful analysis of the ECA led the Court to the conclusion that Parliament intended EU law rights to have effect in UK law, "and that this effect should not be capable of being undone or overridden by action taken by the Crown in exercise of its prerogative powers". 129 In the last part of its judgment, the Court established that its findings were not contradicted by the existing judicial authorities.
B. The Effects of the Withdrawal Decision and its Notification on the Role of Parliament
Part of the debate on Miller focuses on the nature and scope of the Government's treatymaking powers, which include the making of treaties and the withdrawal from them. Critics of commentators even treat withdrawal from the EU as completely analogous to the termination of double-taxation treaties. 130 Those criticisms are difficult to sustain in the face of the legal character (let alone the breadth) of the rights which EU law confers, which we have already examined. However, there is also the peculiar way in which Article 50 sets up the withdrawal process, which shows that, in terms of any parliamentary role, withdrawal is very different from accession to the EU or Treaty amendment. These differences have not been sufficiently articulated. In particular, there seems to be a widespread misconception that, at the end of the Brexit negotiations, Parliament will at any rate have a chance to confirm or reject the results, and that there is therefore no need for it to have a say in the triggering of Article 50. were to instruct the Government to negotiate such an agreement.
In other words, it is incorrect to assume that, at any rate, Parliament will be able to have its say at the end of the withdrawal process. Even in formal terms, that is not inevitably the case, and if there is a withdrawal agreement, in substance Parliament will be faced with either approving it, or mandating the hardest of Brexits.
All this is distinct from the question whether notification is revocable. As we argue further below, that is a question which applies, not so much to notification, but to the actual constitutional decision to withdraw. The distinction is clear enough. Assuming that "Brexit means Brexit", what is the role of Parliament, and at what point does it need to get involved?
The above analysis speaks to that question. It is an altogether different question whether the Brexit decision itself can be revoked, unilaterally, by the United Kingdom.
C. The Rights Conferred by EU Law
It is generally accepted that use of the Royal Prerogative does not allow the Government to interfere with rights under UK law, and in particular with statutory rights. The Divisional Court took the effect of the withdrawal decision/notification on EU law rights as critical to its analysis. It established that there are three categories of EU law rights. 133 First, those rights which Parliament could maintain or replicate post-Brexit, for example employment and equality rights. Second, rights which UK citizens and residents have in other Member States.
Those rights could be maintained in the post-Brexit relationship between the UK and the EU, but that depends on the terms of the withdrawal agreement and any further agreements.
Third, rights which will inevitably be lost, because they are conditional on membership -the prime example being the political rights to vote for the European Parliament, and to stand as a candidate in EP elections.
Miller's critics argue that the rights conferred under EU law are not genuine statutory rights.
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They say that the ECA is a mere conduit for rights which are located on the international plane. This is a consequence of the dualist nature of the UK constitution. Parliament has given them that force in the ECA. The fact that the rights are international in nature is evidenced by the reference in Section 2(1) ECA to those rights as they exist "from time to time". It is for the Government to vary these rights, the critics argue, through its participation in EU law-making. Indeed, the rights are also contingent on action by other Member States (e.g. another Member State could withdraw, and thereby terminate the rights of UK citizens in that state). Likewise, the Government can decide to withdraw from the EU, which effectively will put an end to at least some of these rights. That is simply a function of the Royal Prerogative in terms of negotiating international treaties. The ECA is there to give domestic effect to the EU Treaties, and the rights which those Treaties (and EU legislation)
confer. Without the ECA, there could be no domestic effect. That does not mean that the Government is incapable of using the Royal Prerogative in such a way that membership comes to an end.
A first reply to this dualism critique would revolve around the need to recognise that, when Parliament enacted the ECA, it was fully aware of the direct effect and primacy of EU law, and therefore of the concept that EU law is, of its own force, domestic law. Article 2(1) ECA provides that all "rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures from time to time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties are without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom shall be recognised and available in law, and be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly."
This provision surely recognises that EU law conceives of the rights which it confers as fully integrated into domestic law. Parliament did not qualify the direct effect and supremacy of EU law; it confirmed it, and ensured that it could work in accordance with EU law principle.
However, there is a more significant reply to the dualism critique. It is inherently contradictory, and one could say that it is post-truth, or involves having one's cake and eating it. If indeed the United Kingdom has remained completely dualist, notwithstanding EU membership, then the only conceivable basis for EU law rights in UK law is the ECA. The rights, as they exist in UK law, cannot be anything but a product of Parliament's enactment of the ECA. They are pure statutory rights. Parliament itself has not listed those rights. Instead, it has chosen to "outsource" their definition, amendment, even creation to this international organization called the EU, of which the United Kingdom is a member and in the institutional framework of which the Government (and occasionally Parliament itself) 136 have a role to play. This is something Parliament can do as it is fully sovereign. But the only reason for giving effect to those rights in UK law is the ECA. What else are they then but statutory rights? The more one emphasises an absolute form of dualism, the more incontrovertible it is that EU law rights are, in the United Kingdom, statutory rights.
The contingent nature of the rights that EU law confers is also inadequate for criticising Miller.
It is not clear whether this criticism is different from the claim that the rights are ambulatory, in the sense that they change "from time to time". Of course, many rights under EU law are contingent on the legislation which the EU adopts. It is the Government which participates in the adoption of such legislation, through its membership of the Council of Ministers. But the Council does not act alone, and UK citizens are represented in the European Parliament, which is the co-legislator. At any rate, the UK Government cannot adopt EU legislation on its own, whereas the Government's claim in Miller is that it can, singlehandedly, trigger withdrawal. 136 See, e.g. Article 12 TEU. This provision envisages a variety of ways in which national parliaments contribute to the good functioning of the EU. For example, they are duly notified of legislative proposals, review the observance of subsidiarity and proportionality and can oppose the adoption of legislation under the passerelle clauses of Articles 81 TFEU and 48(7) TEU.
More important, however, is that the fundamental rights which EU law confers (understood in It is not clear how far the argument stretches as the Claimants are rightly saying that this leaves intact the claim that at least some rights are affected.
At any rate, the attack on category (ii) rights misses its target. The picture painted is one of a series of legal technicalities, embedded in judicial precedent and complex legislative language. However, the question about constitutional authority to withdraw from (as opposed to acceding to) a supranational organisation with the kind of dimensions the EU has, is wholly unprecedented. international negotiations such as CETA and TTIP are in substance "about" legislation.
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They concern a wide range of matters which, in domestic law, are legislative in nature. It is therefore unsustainable, from a democracy perspective, to leave those negotiations exclusively in executive hands. Indeed, the Leave campaign's slogan about taking back control, arguably the principal driver of the referendum outcome, reflects the level of general unease with the growing transfer of law-making to the international plane.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to offer a full critique of the single major defence of executive dominance in foreign affairs: that such affairs are about reciprocal bargaining for which executives are best equipped, and which cannot be conducted in parliamentary chambers. 147 It is a defence which dominates the current political discourse. Prime Minister
May will not give a running commentary on the Brexit negotiations in Parliament, because it would wholly undermine the Government's ability to conclude the best possible deal for
Britain. 148 However, even the most superficial analysis of what is at stake in the Brexit negotiations reveals the defects of such a conception.
Withdrawal and the determination of the future relationship between the United Kingdom and the EU are not a zero-sum game, which can be subjected to an overall cost-benefit analysis.
They involve a series of deeply political decisions on a range of incommensurables. For example, whether the United Kingdom keeps free movement, or some degree of it, has nothing in common with the question whether it wishes to continue to cooperate in the field of counter-terrorism; the acceptance of some form of jurisdiction of the EU Court of Justice has no connection with the choice between a customs union and a free-trade-area; payments into the EU budget are completely distinct from keeping the European Arrest Warrant. Each of those policy choices is distinct and different, and deserves proper democratic deliberation.
Just imagine that all of these choices, with all of their consequences for domestic legislation in the relevant field, and for the rights and obligations of citizens, non-citizens, and companies, can simply be made by the Government, with no Parliamentary involvement other than the final decision, once a withdrawal agreement has been negotiated, to accept the "deal", or to reject it and risk the hardest of Brexits. The wording of Article 50 is not clear on the point of revocability. While, as Jean-Claude Piris has put it, 'intentions' can change, 151 Article 50(2) does not concern the notification of a mere political intention, but of a decision to withdraw taken in accordance with a Member State's constitutional requirements. In turn, an intention of this kind has a clear legal meaning and constitutional implications for the European Union, as laid down in Article 50(3), namely the commencement of a two-year process for exit.
The possibility of a withdrawing state changing its mind about leaving can be read into this provision in two ways: instead of an agreement to leave the EU, an agreement not to leave the EU can be reached amongst the parties. The future relationship with the EU of the stateno-longer-wishing-to-withdraw following the negotiations would then be merely a reaffirmation of the application of the Treaties to that state. This would be a legally intricate solution but nonetheless imaginable. Alternatively, the state-no-longer-wishing-to-withdraw and its counterparts could unanimously agree to extend the negotiations indefinitely and, eventually, to insert a protocol into the Treaties to the effect that the notification of withdrawal under Article 50 has been revoked. As such, even on a strict reading of Article 50, there are some possibilities for changing the course of action during the process.
However, neither of these options amounts to a possibility for a state unilaterally to revoke its notification. We fully agree with Paul Craig's point that if a Member State bona fide changes its mind about leaving, it would be absurd for the European Union -and indeed for other
Member States -to force it to withdraw based on the assumed irrevocability of Article 50.
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We also agree with Sarmiento that it would 'make no sense' for other EU Member States not to accept such a change of heart, in light of the political and economic repercussions that a withdrawal would cause to the EU overall. 153 Article 50 can certainly be stopped if everyone believes that that would be in their common interest. The problem is that it becomes far less straightforward if that is not the case. Indeed, it is only meaningful to discuss revocability of a duly notified decision to leave the Union if the withdrawing state can legally compel everyone else to accept the revocation.
In our view, the distinction between the decision to withdraw and its notification is again critical. A Member State is entitled to decide, in accordance with its constitutional requirements, to withdraw from the EU. If that Member State re-considered that decision, within the two-year timeframe, it would not only be absurd but also unconstitutional for the Union not to accept a bona fide revocation of the notification. 154 The reference to constitutional requirements in Art 50(1) suggests that, in order to revoke the notification, the withdrawing state would simply need to show that the decision to withdraw is no longer compatible with its constitutional requirements, in that a new decision has been taken. There is of course a need to avoid abuse of the Article 50 process. The overall structure of Article 50 could be conceived of in the following way. As noted above, it is clear from the travaux that the provision should retain the withdrawing state's right of unilateral exit from the Union. While a series of amendments had been proposed that were intended to make the conditions of withdrawal stricter (e.g. making withdrawal conditional on Treaty change 158 and inserting an explicit requirement of compatibility with international law 159 ), these were not adopted. Article 50(1) entitles the withdrawing state to take a decision to leave simply 'in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.' The other Member States and the Union itself have no say in the taking of that decision or in its notification under Article 50(2).
Additionally, Article 50 does not make the withdrawal conditional on an agreement. The twoyear negotiation period mentioned in Article 50(3) simply enables the EU and the withdrawing state to reach an agreement. At the same time, if they do not wish to, or find themselves unable to do so, it provides a safety valve for both parties. The withdrawing state is at liberty not to have any further association with the Union. In turn, the remaining Member States hold the cards as to whether the negotiations will be extended.
To some extent, therefore, the structure of Article 50 tilts the scales in favour of the EU at the negotiation stage. But it could not be otherwise. In light of the autonomous power to decide to withdraw in accordance with its own constitutional requirements that Article 50 affords the withdrawing state, it is logical that the provision then balances that discretion with stricter conditions upon notification. If the decision to withdraw could be revoked unilaterally after a valid notification had been communicated to the European Council, the withdrawing state could simply stall the negotiations by using that possibility to its benefit if it found it difficult to negotiate the agreement it was hoping for. The scope for abuse is clear: a state wishing to 156 That depends entirely on the outcome of the Miller appeal: see (n 3). 157 Duff (n 29) 9. 158 Proposed amendments (n 49) 4. 159 Ibid, 26.
withdraw could notify, engage in a two-year negotiation, withdraw that notification and then re-notify and repeat the process. That would have the effect of holding the Union and other
Member States hostage to an extended negotiation without engaging the unanimity requirement set out in Article 50(3). And it is precisely that possibility that, in light of the travaux, the drafters of the provision had sought to prevent.
At the same time, though, the constitutional case for forcing a Member State to withdraw from the Union if it bona fide wished to remain is weak. The possibility of abuse would be prevented by the requirement that withdrawal of the notification should be in good faith. At this stage, the extent to which the withdrawing state would be required to prove that it is acting based on a genuine change of heart is difficult to predict. In light of the fact that EU law has a distinct, but fairly limited doctrine of abuse of law 160 and has never encountered that question in similar circumstances, the matter may need to be litigated before the Court of Justice. Still, provided it is in good faith, a unilateral revocation of the decision to withdraw should be possible. If a Member State could not remove its notification after changing its mind, and was thus forced to leave upon the conclusion of a two-year period under Article 
V. Conclusion
The constitutional questions at stake in the process of withdrawing from the EU are of the utmost importance for the Union's construction. It is the commitment to constitutional values that distinguishes the European Union from other international organisations. These values are put to the test during Brexit. As we have sought to demonstrate, it is essential to read
Article 50 from a constitutionalist viewpoint: its context is one of constitutionalisation and its implications will mark national constitutions and the postnational constitutional structure of the European Union at the most basic level, irrespective of whether one considers it a radically pluralist, unifying federal, or more mildly integrationist one. Article 50 raises important constitutional concerns not only for the withdrawing state -an issue that thrives in the UK blogosphere -but also from the perspective of the EU and its identity as a new legal order that creates rights and duties and safeguards them through accountable institutions, rather than being merely an international treaty signed by states. A constitutionalist reading of Article 50 brings into sharper relief the fact that the withdrawal process cannot be one that is entirely at the mercy of politics. It is governed by specific constitutional stipulations on the EU side as well. They necessitate respect for the UK's constitutional decision to withdraw; but, at the same time, due respect for rights as foundational pillars of the Union and, and for other EU constitutional values such as the rule of law and democratic governance.
In turn, it would be flawed to assume that constitutional questions pertaining to withdrawal from the perspective of the United Kingdom can really be addressed by excluding the constitutional dimensions of these questions from the EU side, except partially and temporarily. In light of the integrated nature of the EU and the UK, the EU constitution is both shaped by -and greatly affects -many crucial constitutional features of the UK's own legal order, as important as human rights, legitimate expectations and constraints on public power.
Our suggestions are therefore far from revolutionary. They entail, rather, respect for basic, and highly convergent, constitutional structures that have underpinned the relationship between the UK and the EU so far. They can be subsumed under the rubric of the rule of law and commitment to the democratic process. Indeed, the relationship between respect for constitutional guarantees and meaningful deliberative action in the public sphere is inherent. 166 It is one on which both the UK and the EU constitutional orders are premised. It is
